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Algorithmic flexibility markets can support the energy transition by coordinating distributed prosumer resources through automated platforms. Yet participation depends not only on price signals but also on whether prosumers trust platforms, perceive compensation as fair, and believe flexibility provision will not compromise reliability. Existing work has advanced knowledge on peer-to-peer trading, demand response, virtual power plants, and automated energy coordination. However, no unified theory fully explains how trust, fairness, incentives, and grid reliability requirements jointly shape prosumer participation in algorithmic flexibility markets. This article develops a theory-building model of prosumer participation in algorithmic flexibility markets. The model links micro-level perceptions of trust, fairness, and incentives with macro-level grid reliability requirements and market design constraints. The article is conceptual and develops theory by integrating behavioural, institutional, technological, and energy-system perspectives. It defines core constructs, specifies causal relationships, and derives propositions for future empirical testing. The theory proposes that participation emerges from four interlocking mechanisms: trust in algorithmic platforms, perceived fairness of compensation and procedures, incentive salience, and perceived alignment with grid reliability needs. These mechanisms interact dynamically rather than operating as independent determinants. The model provides a foundation for future empirical research and for designing flexibility markets that are technically effective and socially acceptable. It also clarifies why participation may fail even when economic incentives appear attractive.